%0 Conference Proceedings
%T An Anti-jamming Strategy When it Is Unknown Which Receivers Will Face with Smart Interference
%+ WINLAB Rutgers University
%+ Saint Petersburg State Polytechnical University (SPSPU)
%+ Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering [Piscataway]
%A Garnaev, Andrey
%A Trappe, Wade
%A Petropulu, Athina
%Z Part 4: Network Security
%< avec comité de lecture
%( Lecture Notes in Computer Science
%B International Conference on Wired/Wireless Internet Communication (WWIC)
%C Boston, MA, United States
%Y Kaushik Roy Chowdhury
%Y Marco Di Felice
%Y Ibrahim Matta
%Y Bo Sheng
%I Springer International Publishing
%3 Wired/Wireless Internet Communications
%V LNCS-10866
%P 195-206
%8 2018-06-18
%D 2018
%R 10.1007/978-3-030-02931-9_16
%K Bayesian game
%K Multicast communication
%K Jamming
%Z Computer Science [cs]
%Z Computer Science [cs]/Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI]Conference papers
%X The paper considers a communication system consisting of a communication node utilizing multiple antennas in order to communicate with a group of receivers, while potentially facing interference from one or more jammers. The jammers impact the scenario by possibly interfering some of the receivers. The objective of the jammers is to reduce the throughput of nearby receivers, while taking into account the cost/risk of jamming. The fact that jammers face a cost implies that they might not choose to interfere, and thus the communication node faces uncertainty about which of its receivers will be jammed. This uncertainty is modeled by the communicator having only a priori probabilities about whether each receiver will face hostile interference or not, and if he does face such jamming, whether the jamming attack is smart or not. The goal of the communication node is to distribute total power resources to maximize the total throughput associated with communicating with all of the receivers. The problem is formulated as a Bayesian game between the communication system and the jammers. A waterfilling equation to find the equilibrium is derived, and its uniqueness is proven. The threshold value on the power budget is established for the receivers to be non-altruistic.
%G English
%Z TC 6
%Z WG 6.2
%2 https://inria.hal.science/hal-02269717/document
%2 https://inria.hal.science/hal-02269717/file/470666_1_En_16_Chapter.pdf
%L hal-02269717
%U https://inria.hal.science/hal-02269717
%~ IFIP-LNCS
%~ IFIP
%~ IFIP-TC
%~ IFIP-TC6
%~ IFIP-WG6-2
%~ IFIP-WWIC
%~ IFIP-LNCS-10866