%0 Conference Proceedings
%T Breaking and Fixing the Security Proof of Garbled Bloom Filters
%+ Eurecom [Sophia Antipolis]
%A Rompay, Cédric, Van
%A Önen, Melek
%Z Part 6: Fixing Vulnerabilities
%< avec comité de lecture
%( Lecture Notes in Computer Science
%B 32th IFIP Annual Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy (DBSec)
%C Bergamo, Italy
%Y Florian Kerschbaum
%Y Stefano Paraboschi
%I Springer International Publishing
%3 Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXXII
%V LNCS-10980
%P 263-277
%8 2018-07-16
%D 2018
%R 10.1007/978-3-319-95729-6_17
%K Garbled bloom filter
%K Private set intersection
%K Provable security
%Z Computer Science [cs]Conference papers
%X We identify a flaw in the proof of security of Garbled Bloom Filters, a recent hash structure introduced by Dong et al. (ACM CCS 2013) that is used to design Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols, a important family of protocols for secure cloud computing. We give counter-examples invalidating a claim that is central to the original proof and we show that variants of the GBF construction have the same issue in their security analysis. We then give a new proof of security that shows that Garbled Bloom Filters are secure nonetheless.
%G English
%Z TC 11
%Z WG 11.3
%2 https://inria.hal.science/hal-01954406/document
%2 https://inria.hal.science/hal-01954406/file/470961_1_En_17_Chapter.pdf
%L hal-01954406
%U https://inria.hal.science/hal-01954406
%~ EURECOM
%~ IFIP-LNCS
%~ IFIP
%~ IFIP-TC
%~ IFIP-WG
%~ IFIP-TC11
%~ IFIP-WG11-3
%~ IFIP-DBSEC
%~ IFIP-LNCS-10980