%0 Conference Proceedings
%T A Semi-Dynamic Evolutionary Power Control Game
%+ Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon (LIA)
%+ Models for the performance analysis and the control of networks (MAESTRO)
%+ SMACS Research Group
%A Haddad, Majed
%A Altman, Eitan
%A Gaillard, Julien
%A Fiems, Dieter
%Z Part 8: Wireless Networks II
%< avec comité de lecture
%( Lecture Notes in Computer Science
%B 11th International Networking Conference (NETWORKING)
%C Prague, Czech Republic
%Y Robert Bestak
%Y Lukas Kencl
%Y Li Erran Li
%Y Joerg Widmer
%Y Hao Yin
%I Springer
%3 NETWORKING 2012
%V LNCS-7290
%N Part II
%P 392-403
%8 2012-05-21
%D 2012
%R 10.1007/978-3-642-30054-7_31
%K Evolutionary game theory
%K Hawk and Dove game
%K Power control
%K Battery life
%Z Computer Science [cs]Conference papers
%X In this paper, we study a power control game over a collision channel. Each player has an energy state. When choosing a higher transmission power, the chances of a successful transmission (in the presence of other interference) increases at the cost of a larger decrease in the energy state of the battery. A central feature in these games is that of the limitation on battery life. Natural questions that arise concern the behavior of mobile users in the presence of interference. How should a mobile user behave given his initial energy state? We study this dynamic game when restricting to simple non dynamic strategies that consist on choosing a given power level that is maintained during the lifetime of the battery. We identify a surprising paradox which we call the Hawk and Dove resource abundance paradox.
%G English
%Z TC 6
%2 https://hal.science/hal-01299776/document
%2 https://hal.science/hal-01299776/file/978-3-642-30054-7_31_Chapter.pdf
%L hal-01299776
%U https://hal.science/hal-01299776
%~ UNIV-AVIGNON
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%~ IFIP-LNCS
%~ IFIP
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%~ IFIP-TC
%~ IFIP-TC6
%~ IFIP-LNCS-7290
%~ IFIP-NETWORKING
%~ LIA