ICT's for democracy in Latin America?

Yanina Welp
Center for Research on Direct Democracy
yanina.welp@zda.uzh.ch

Abstract. Should Latin American governments concentrate their efforts in improving efficiency, transparency and accountability or should they also aim to increase the participation of citizens in decision-making? Is there a risk of reinforcing inequality through the promotion of ICT's for democracy in countries with a considerable digital divide? Is there a risk of reinforcing populism, clientelism and concentration of power leaving the promotion of ICT's in hands of strong presidents of the sort that prevail in many Latin American countries today? Based on previous research on Latin America focused on (i) goals and conditions to promote e-democracy; (ii) e-government developments; and (iii) e-democracy initiatives promoted by governments and civil society organizations, the paper explores e-democracy developments and trends and suggests a landscape for further research.

Keywords: e-democracy, e-participation, Latin America, ICT's, Transparency

1 Introduction

In the eighties and nineties in Western countries scholars were beginning to comment on a crisis of representative democracy which was becoming evident in a decrease in participation in elections, in the distrust and lack of interest of citizens in politics [1], and in the fall of partisan and union affiliation [2]. In this context of crisis, many initiatives, including those based on information and communication technologies (ICTs from now on), have been developed with the aim of revitalising democracy, increasing transparency in public management and opening up new spaces for political participation [3]. Even if there are some common points, a look at Latin America shows a different picture. In most countries of the region the transition from dictatorship to democracy began in the eighties. In this sense, far from being “frozen” (as Lipset and Rokkan suggested for the political parties affiliations in Western countries [4]), until now political affiliations have been weak in the majority of the Latin American countries which -with a few exceptions (e.g. Uruguay)- are characterized by weak political party system institutionalization, high volatility of voters preferences from one election to the next and a more important role played by charisma than by ideology [5]. Furthermore, although democracy has persevered in

1 I give thanks to Jonathan Wheatley for his comments and suggestions.
most cases, it coexists with recurrent political and economical crises, institutional instability, political polarization and citizen dissatisfaction.

Which role can and should play the ICTs in this scenario? Is there a risk of reinforcing inequality through the promotion of ICT’s for democracy in countries with a considerable digital divide? Is there a risk of reinforcing populism and concentration of power leaving the promotion of ICTs in hands of strong presidents of the sort that prevail in many Latin American countries today? To deal with these questions the paper summarize previous research findings to explore (i) the context in which e-democracy is developed, with an overview of indicators of quality of democracy, corruption, transparency, electoral turnout and confidence in institutions of representative democracy; (ii) the digital divide and the policies to develop ICTs by governments; (iii) e-democracy initiatives promoted by governments and civil society organizations considering if they are mainly oriented to reinforce representative democracy or if are mainly oriented to extend a participatory democracy. The paper ends with a conclusion on the trends, risks and potentialities; and some suggestions for future research.

2 The Latin American Democracies

This research is focused on 18 Latin American countries. Among these countries, democracy has worked continuously at least throughout the last fifty years in Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela; for between 21 and 31 years in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay; and for less than twenty years in Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, Panama, and Mexico. This suggests that there is no correlation between the longevity of democracy and the system's stability given that some of the older democracies are also the most unstable or violent, such as Venezuela and Colombia respectively; and some of the younger democracies can be included in the group of the most consolidated not only in the region but also in the world, such as Uruguay or Brazil. Secondly, a paradox undergone by most Latin American countries is frequently quoted as on the one hand, they have more or less institutionalized a democratic regime as a form of government but, on the other, they face a succession of social and political crises. There are abundant examples of this. Many popular demonstrations have led to early elections and/or the establishment of transition and provisional governments. Thirteen presidents in nine of the seventeen countries analyzed here were unable to complete their mandate and in some cases also democracy was seriously in trouble (with the

The closing of the congress in Peru by Fujimori, in 1992; or with the uprising of Lucio Gutierrez in Ecuador in 2000, only to quote two cases.

The previous commentary lead us to one of the most controversial political sciences issues which is the definition of Democracy. The classical Dahl’s work suggests the concept of polyarchy to define a set of institutional arrangements that permits public opposition and establishes the right to participate in politics. While democracy is an ideal, polyarchy is a measurable dimension. Its minimum requirements are: freedom to form and join organizations; freedom of expression; the right to vote; eligibility for public office; the right of political leaders to compete for support; alternative sources of information; free and fair elections; institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference [6].

The Freedom House Index [7] allows to consider the strengths of the Latin American contemporary democracies, showing that nine of the countries studied were considered as free democracies in 2008, being the other eight qualified as a partly free (for details on this and the following data see table 1 in the annex). The picture of the corruption and lack of transparency is not better. The Corruption Perceptions Index for 2006 [8] shows that just two countries can be considered relatively clean (Uruguay and Chile), while the rest are qualified as corrupt or highly corrupt (the latest applies for Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay or Venezuela between others). A third index, the Open Budget Index, concerning to transparency on Budgetary Information [9] shows a similar picture. Among the thirteen Latin American countries analyzed, just Brazil and Peru provide with significant information while none shows an extensive provision, in five the provision is qualified as minimal (Ecuador, El Salvador) or scant (Bolivia, Honduras, Panama) and the rest of the countries provide some information (note that Chile and Uruguay were not included in this sample). The lack of transparency not necessarily means corruption, but goes clearly against public capacity to control the power, and contributes to hide corruption.

The situation is even worse for political parties, here with the exception of Uruguay (40%) and Guatemala (34%), in all the countries confidence is located below 30% with the lowest figures in Bolivia (8%), Chile and Paraguay (5%), Ecuador and Peru (4%). Despite these bad results, polls show that governments are steadily becoming more popular. However, happens that leaders are increasing their power against institutions of representative democracy, while political parties displays the lowest confidence.

It has to be mentioned the constant reform of institutions observed in the Sanction of new constitutions and the introduction of direct democratic mechanisms in several countries [11]. Quite often, in scenarios in which an emergent power confront
an elite removed from its hegemonic positions, the top down referendum has become a potent weapon to resolve situations of political impasse (Venezuela 1999, Ecuador 2007, Bolivia 2009, Peru 1993). In these cases the most common reason to call for a referendum is an attempt to resolve a struggle between parliament and the president or the president and the governors or authorities of the opposition. The constitutional reform to extend the president mandate is also included in several of these consultations (Colombia, the Zelaya's attempt previous to the coup d'Etat in Honduras). In some cases, even if the immediate effect of the referendum is a high social polarization, in the long run it could be a first step towards acceptance of the rules of the democratic game. However, other consequence is the weakness of the equilibrium between powers in favor of the president.\[12\]

To the analyses of Electoral turnout should be noted that in a good proportion of the Latin American countries voting is compulsory. However countries either do not enforce compulsory voting laws (i.e Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay and Honduras) or the enforcement is weak (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Chile). Thus, despite compulsory voting, it seems that these laws merely states what the citizen's responsibility should be. In any case, the average turnout in the six last elections (parliamentary and presidential) is 67%, with strong differences between the highest turnout -Uruguay with 90.7% (and strict enforcement of compulsory voting)- and the lowest -Colombia with 36.6% and El Salvador with 45% on average. The lowest turnout is registered in the countries in which voting is not compulsory. However, also countries without compulsory voting show low turnout (Guatemala, 48% or Mexico 59%) and countries with compulsory voting shows turnout above the average (as Nicaragua with 70% or Panama 75%).\[4\]

A surprising finding linked with Dahl's third requirement (the right to vote) emerges from the evolution of the number of the registered voter's over time. By analyzing the increase of registered voters from the first election of the eighties until the last (e.g. for Ecuador since the elections of 1984 to the elections in 2006) a huge increase of the voters is observed. In the case of Ecuador the electoral roll increased by 145% during the twenty-two year period while the natural increase of population for the same period was just 51%, meaning that at least 62% of the increase in the registered voters comes from the extension of political rights (probably indigenous and rural population not registered previously). A similar picture emerges for several other countries in which a huge increase in the number of voters cannot be explained by the natural increase in the population. This quantitative extension of political rights also exceed 40% (over and above the natural increase in the population) in Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. Only in Chile and Costa Rica does the opposite apply (a relative fall in the number of registered voters of 14% and 3% respectively). The large anomaly in Chile can be explained by the fact that one is required to vote only if is a registered voter, but is not compulsory.

3 Uruguay is an exception to this trend given that direct democracy is in hands of the people (Presidents are not allowed to call a referendum). The mechanism has been used with frequency, becoming a factor of political legitimization and given to the people the power of being a veto player in Tsebelis terms \[13\].

4 Data calculated on July 2009.
to register. This apparent drop in the proportion of the population that is registered to vote could therefore be explained by a failure to register. Again, far from being frozen, Latin American political arena seems to be in constant movement.

To sum up, first of all has to be underlined that the region displays strong differences between countries, with a broad range of outcomes in terms of quality of democracy, electoral turnout, etc. Several countries are characterized by a high level of corruption, increasing distrust in the institutions of representative democracy, increasing political conflict and polarization within the framework of recurrent political crises. These crises mainly stem from inequality and poverty but are exacerbated by corruption and/or as a result of the failure of elected governments to comply with their electoral programs. Institutional instability in Latin American countries is reinforced by the fact that elections are the primary mechanism of accountability. Elections are central to democratic life, but are not enough to promote responsible governments. In countries where a significant segment of the public has been excluded from access to public goods and lack institutional mechanisms at their disposal, discontent and spontaneous protest are common. In this context, how are ICTs being used to contribute to reinforce good governance and democracy?

3 The spread of the Information Society

As several scholars have pointed out, widespread access to the Internet is conditional on wealth [14]. However, even if it has been at different speeds and with different consequences for social organization, Internet diffusion has been remarkable in all the regions of the world. In Latin America is observed a gradual increase of users who could provide sustenance to these new initiatives. Data from the International Telecommunications Union for 2008 [15] shows that the most advanced countries have below 40% of Internet users (Brazil 37%, Uruguay 40%), while in some poorer countries access to the Internet remains near or below 10% (Nicaragua 3%, Honduras 13%, Paraguay 14%). Although figures for Internet access are low in this latter group of countries, with notable exceptions (Nicaragua) they also show a constant growth. In any case, the considerable gap between those who have access and those who not is an important challenge for governments.

The development of e-government is desirable for various reasons that are mainly linked to improving the efficiency of public administration. ICTs could contribute to the streamlining of services, the reduction of costs, the reduction of personnel oriented to bureaucratic jobs and the reduction of waiting times, amongst others [16]. While these are the main argument to reform public administration, the diffusion of ICT’s was also accompanied by an emphasis on the potential to improve the quality of democracy. e-democracy has been defined as the use of electronic communication as a means for granting citizens the power to make lawmakers and politicians accountable for their actions in the public sphere by strengthening transparency in the political process, the improvement of the quality of the stages of opinion formation or the increase of citizen participation in the decision-making
process [17]. Quite often it is difficult to establish a clear line between what e-government is and what e-democracy is given that, for instance, transparency in the public purchase produce a better democracy and probably a more efficient government avoiding corruption. The same applies for e-voting system, which has been introduced mainly to replace traditional systems with the intention of guarantee more transparent results. The most spread system in Latin America is the Ballot Box (Urna electrónica) developed and used mainly in Brazil and Venezuela [18] but also Costa Rica, Paraguay, Ecuador and some states of Mexico.

The use of ICTs by Latin American governments is widespread. All of them have developed government portals and have strategic and/or action plans. The lack of studies on the field increases the difficulties to assess it, although could be mentioned that the promotion of ICTs is significant and has gained an increasing weight. The use of ICTs by Latin American governments is widespread; all of them have developed government and legislative portals [19], and e-politics [20] also in the local level [21]. However, differences between actions are huge. e.g. previous research has shown that while some portals are a complicated map of scarcely-accessible information, other are more a propagandistic window of the government while a third group is organized in a more user-friendly manner to satisfy citizens’ needs (e.g. by profile, theme and/or key facts) [22]. Here we will explore initiatives oriented to promote transparency in the public access to the information and specially on the legislative process; and in participatory experiences in law-making.

4 Opening Democracy through ICTs

There is a tension in the understanding of what e-democracy should be and whom would be the main promoter. Should Latin American governments concentrate their efforts in improving efficiency, transparency and accountability or should they also aim to increase the participation of citizens in decision-making? The answer to this questions leads to a more general question of what type of democracy is desirable. Dalton [23] defines it as follows: “On one side of the democratic spectrum stands the model of articulating citizen demands through representation. This model often takes the form of party-based parliamentary rule and functions primarily through elected representatives (…) At the other end of the spectrum is the model of direct democracy placing control in the hand of the people themselves”.

Sartori [24] stresses that representative democracy is the best system of government in contemporary society because it prevents against the radicalization that direct democratic procedures would lead. In turn, the control and limitation of powers allows civil society to exercise their role controlling governments and granting legitimacy to the system through the established procedures for the election of representatives. Sartori argues that the ways in which citizens access information and the degree to which they are subjugated by the pressures of opinion makers define the scope and limitations of substantive democracy. From this point of view, competence and multiplicity of sources of information are a guarantee of an autonomous public
opinion, and conditions for democracy. And that is something allowed for new
technologies given that where a strong civil society is claiming for information and
exercising public control, governments will be forced to open up; and concentrated
and powerful mass media will have new competitors. It means, more information has
to be offered by governments and more control exercised by the public.

On the other side, even if no system is becoming a direct democratic system
various processes have converged to promote a more participatory system. Citizen
participation refers to any voluntary action by citizens more or less directly aimed at
influencing public decision making and the management of collective affairs [25]. In
this sense, citizen participation could be understood as taking part in those public
affairs that affect society as a whole.

4.1 Reinforcing Representative Democracy

Parliaments and governments are increasingly uploading information on the website
and has to be stressed the creation of portals to promote the access to the information,
e.g. in Costa Rica the Comptroller General’s Office has developed a portal that brings
together systematic public information to which citizens can access.\(^5\) The Federal
Institute for Access to Public Information of Mexico, meanwhile, offers information
not only on finances but also on a wide range of information identified as public,
specifying the procedure.\(^6\) In any case, all the countries of the region display a
-growing presence on the website and with different scales, an increasing transparency
of their work. However, that is not systematic.

From the side of civil society, features which help to empower civil society
are interactivity given that users may communicate on a many-to-many reciprocal
basis), free speech and free association, and construction and dissemination of
information which is not subject to official review or sanction. Civil Society
Organizations are using these tools. Although systematic research is required to
analyses its outcomes is possible to quote some innovative developments such as the
initiative called Congreso Visible (Visible Parliament)\(^7\), launched by the Universidad
de los Andes, in Colombia, that arises with the intent to change the bad perceptions
citizens have on parliamentarians and prevent corruption. The objectives of the
initiative include, among others, the monitoring and evaluation of legislators and
parliamentary coalitions or the training of the organizations involved in promoting the
participation of citizens and minorities. The public can check out the legislators
agenda, bills promoted and voted and other related activities. Participation is not
mandatory for parliamentarians but as soon as the initiative starts to be joined for
more politicians there is informal pressure to join. This has an immediate effect to
return relevant information easily accessible but also play a role in the long run
because it is possible to see what a representative votes over time (to what extent it is
consistent), changes in their heritage and their legislative activity (how many and

---

\(^5\) Contraloría General de la República: http://cgrw01.cgr.go.cr/
\(^6\) Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información: http://www.ifai.org.mx/
\(^7\) http://cvisible.uniandes.edu.co/
what kind of initiatives introduced, how often attends the meetings?). Projects such
this are growing in the region and will need further research to know their effects.8

4.2 Participatory democracy

One of the best known participatory democracy experiences is the participatory
budgeting but there are also citizen councils, public audiences and other mechanisms
which seeks to address the emergence of a growing gap between citizens and the
political system [26]. The local level has been a privileged space for participation
because this scale of government, so close to the citizenry, facilitates the dialogue
between the actors [27]. But even if individual citizens’ commitment to the local
agenda is more frequent than to the national one, participatory experiences based on
ICT’s are also growing in the national level. Relevant political processes such as
elections, discussion of certain laws that carry a high degree of polarization or debate,
or constitutional reforms aroused the interest of the citizenry. Internet facilitates the
access to the proposals and also create a forum for debate. The monitoring of
parliamentary activity allows citizens organized to react and make their voices heard
before a bill is passed.9

There is a greater difference among actions because, while in some cases the
creation of sectorial forums, for example, has been promoted (Mexico, Bolivia) or
virtual legislative programs in which citizens may participate have been created (such
as the virtual Parliament in Peru and Chile), in other cases, the appeal to citizens is
mainly symbolic, as in the case of virtual mailboxes to write to the President
(Paraguay) [28]. It is important to differentiate the opening of ‘symbolic’ spaces of
participation from spaces where it is possible to raise and follow-up proposals, and
from spaces of citizen interaction designed for the formulation of bills. Most of the
latter were developed by the legislative assembly. One such program is Virtual
Senator, held in Chile, which allows people to know and discuss bills.10 The views
expressed are referred to committees, so the senators members can consider opinions
when voting. Other participatory process with a strong use of ICT was the
constitutional convention in Ecuador.11

5. A Landscape for further Research

Undoubtedly, the publication of budgets, the laws on access to information, and the
monitoring of legislative activity could help controlling corruption and reducing the
gap between citizenry and representatives. Although the change is political, is

8 http://www.institutoagora.org.br
9 Brasil www.brasil.gov.br/participacao_popular/forum,
Guatemala www.congreso.gob.gt/gt/forodiscusion.asp or Peru www.congreso.gob.pe
10 http://senadorvirtual.senado.cl
11 http://www.asambleanacional.gov.ec
facilitated by technology. New political actors and respect for the rules of the democratic game are forcing an opening up the system. Latin America needs more and better channels for citizens to make decisions; however, strong political leaderships and the digital divide invite us to be cautious. Latin America needs better institutions for a better democracy. In this sense, there is no doubt about the benefits of an efficient and transparent government. Transparency in government activities has an effect of control on the government, and of learning for citizens, who will be more qualified for decision making. The fight against corruption and access to information of public interest is maybe not revolutionary, but can encourage important changes in a region in constant movement.

The development of participatory initiatives using ICTs is not crystal clear. To develop a systematic research agenda is required to highlight the consequences of the discussion of ICT’s for democracy. An in deep study of the initiatives to monitor and participate in Parliament activities could be a good starting point. Two dimensions emerged from the previous: on the one hand the analysis of the transparency in the process of law-making (Information about representatives; budget/expenditure; and an assessment of the transparency of the law making process). The second dimension (citizen participation on the policy making) has to be analyzed including on line and not online mechanisms (forums, initiatives to follow parlamentarian activity and send comments or ask questions; but also commission and direct democracy mechanisms, specially the bottom up such as initiative and abrogative referendum). That approach to the parliamentary activity (one of the less valued by the Latin American inhabitants after the political parties) could allow to analyses to what extent ICT’s are contributing to reduce the political gap.

References

7. Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org
15. International Telecommunications Union: http://www.itu.int
Appendix: Tables

Table 1. Quality of Democracy, Corruption and Transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Freedom and Democracy</th>
<th>Corruption</th>
<th>Open Budget Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR CL Status</td>
<td>CPI Scores</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2 2 Free 2.9 Highly corrupt 56 Some</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>3 3 Partly Free 2.7 Highly corrupt 6 Scant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>2 2 Free 3.3 Corrupt 74 Significant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1 1 Free 7.3 na</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3 4 Partly Free 3.9 Corrupt 60 Some</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1 1 Free 4.1 Corrupt 45 Some</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>3 3 Partly Free 2.3 Highly corrupt 38 Minimal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2 3 Free 4 Corrupt 37 Minimal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>3 4 Partly Free 2.6 Highly corrupt 45 Some</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>3 3 Partly Free 2.5 Highly corrupt 11 Scant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>2 3 Free 3.3 Corrupt 54 Some</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NicaraguA</td>
<td>4 3 Partly Free 2.6 Highly corrupt 18 Scant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>1 2 Free 3.1 Corrupt na</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>3 3 Partly Free 2.6 Highly corrupt na</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>2 3 Free 3.3 Corrupt 66 Significant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Dominicana</td>
<td>2 2 Free 2.8 Highly corrupt 11 Scant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1 1 Free 6.4 na</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4 4 Partly Free 2.3 Highly corrupt 35 Minimal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Information based on the history of each country, Freedom House, Transparency International and Open Budget Index.

(1) The Freedom House index is built around political rights (PR) questions (grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning of Government) and civil liberties (CL) questions (grouped into Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights). Even if is one of the most accurate should be taken only as a reference because some cases appeared as a problematic (e.g. Peru—after a year of strong social conflicts—qualified as free) 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free for 2008 (Free: 1.0 to 2.5, Partly Free: 3.0 to 5.0; Not Free: 5.5 to 7.0. (See Methodology Summary www.freedomhouse.org)

(2) Corruption Perceptions Index 2006. Transparency International. CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analyst and ranged between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)

(3) Open Budget Index 2008. The Survey collect a comparative dataset into: 1) the dissemination of budget information, 2) the executive’s annual budget proposal to the legislature and other information to analysis policies and practices, and 3) the budget process. The countries that scored between 81-100 are placed in the performance category Provides Extensive Information, those with scores 61-80 % in Provides Significant Information, those with scores 41-60 % in Provides Some Information, those with scores 21-40 % in Provides Minimal Information, and those with scores 0-20 % in Provides Scant or No Information.
Table 2. Increase of Registered Voters, Turnout Average and Internet Users

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% increase reg. voters¹</th>
<th>% increase population</th>
<th>% increase non natural</th>
<th>Turnout average</th>
<th>Internet Users 2008²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>37.06</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>71.46</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>48.13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>25.85</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>53.78</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>145.8</td>
<td>51.28</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>137.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>154.2</td>
<td>72.75</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>223.3</td>
<td>101.94</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>126.4</td>
<td>47.24</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>136.2</td>
<td>52.73</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>117.9</td>
<td>49.08</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>152.7</td>
<td>100.92</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>154.3</td>
<td>63.75</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.Dominicana</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>60.86</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>109.5</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Owner calculation based on IDEA (http://www.idea.int/vt/) for registered voters and turnout; and on World Development Indicators database and CIA World Factbook for population. In order to calculate the increase in the registered electors was considered the number of people allowed to vote in the first parliamentary election of the eighties and the number of allowed voters in the last parliamentary election (the research was done in April 2009).

(2) International Telecommunications Union 2008