Sub-Space Clustering, Inter-Clustering Results Association & Anomaly Correlation for Unsupervised Network Anomaly Detection

Johan Mazel†, Pedro Casas†, Yann Labit† and Philippe Owezarski†
†CNRS; LAAS; 7 avenue du colonel Roche, F-31077 Toulouse Cedex 4, France
Université de Toulouse; UPS, INSA, INP, ISAE ; UT1, UTM, LAAS; F-31077 Toulouse Cedex 4, France

Abstract—Network anomaly detection is a critical aspect of network management for instance for QoS, security, etc. The continuous arising of new anomalies and attacks create a continuous challenge to cope with events that put the network integrity at risk. Most network anomaly detection systems proposed so far employ a supervised strategy to accomplish the task, using either signature-based detection methods or supervised-learning techniques. However, both approaches present major limitations: the former fails to detect unknown anomalies (letting the network unprotected for long periods), the latter requires training and labelled traffic, which is difficult and expensive to produce. Such limitations impose a serious bottleneck to the previously presented problem. We introduce an unsupervised approach to detect and characterize network anomalies, without relying on signatures, statistical training, or labelled traffic, which represents a significant step towards the autonomy of networks. Unsupervised detection is accomplished by means of robust data-clustering techniques, combining Sub-Space clustering with Evidence Accumulation or Inter-Clustering Results Association, to blindly identify anomalies in traffic flows. Correlating the results of the unsupervised detection is also performed for improving the detection robustness. Characterization is achieved by building efficient filtering rules to describe a detected anomaly. The detection and characterization performances of the unsupervised approach are evaluated on real network traffic.

Index Terms—Unsupervised Anomaly Detection & Characterization, Clustering, Clusters Isolation, Outliers Detection, Filtering Rules, Anomaly Correlation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Network anomaly detection has become a vital component of any network in today’s Internet. Ranging from non-malicious unexpected events such as flash-crowds and failures, to network attacks such as denials-of-service and network scans, network traffic anomalies can have serious detrimental effects on the performance and integrity of the network. The principal challenge in automatically detecting and characterizing traffic anomalies is that these are moving targets. It is difficult to precisely and permanently define the set of possible anomalies that may arise, especially in the case of network attacks, because new attacks as well as new variants of already known attacks are continuously emerging. A general anomaly detection system should therefore be able to detect a wide range of anomalies with diverse structures, using the least amount of previous knowledge and information, ideally none.

The problem of network anomaly detection has been extensively studied during the last decade. Two different approaches are by far dominant in current research literature and commercial detection systems: signature-based detection and supervised-learning-based detection. Both approaches require some kind of guidance to work, hence they are generally referred to as supervised-detection approaches. Signature-based detection systems are highly effective to detect those anomalies which are programmed to alert on. When a new anomaly is discovered, generally after its occurrence, the associated signature is coded by human experts, which is then used to detect a new occurrence of the same anomaly. Such a detection approach is powerful and very easy to understand, because the operator can directly relate the detected anomaly to its specific signature. However, these systems cannot defend the network against new attacks, simply because they cannot recognize what they do not know. Furthermore, building new signatures is expensive, as it involves manual inspection by human experts.

On the other hand, supervised-learning-based detection uses labelled traffic data to train a baseline model for normal-operation traffic, detecting anomalies as patterns that deviate from this model. Such methods can detect new kinds of anomalies and network attacks not seen before, because they will naturally deviate from the baseline. Nevertheless, supervised-learning requires training, which is time-consuming and depends on the availability of purely anomaly-free traffic data-sets. Labelling traffic as anomaly-free is expensive and hard to achieve in practice, since it is difficult to guarantee that no anomalies are hidden inside the collected traffic. Additionally, it is not easy to maintain an accurate and up-to-date model for anomaly-free traffic, particularly when new services and applications are constantly emerging.

We think that modern anomaly detection systems should not rely on previously acquired knowledge and be able to autonomously detect and characterize traffic deviating from normal-operation one. Autonomous security is a strong requirement in current networks. It is not acceptable to still rely on a human hand made analysis of anomalies and attacks for defining suited countermeasures. Such a hand made process is slow, inefficient, costly and lets the network unprotected for several days in general. The current business process in network security is not fulfilling network requirements in terms of fully efficient security. We therefore proposed a completely unsupervised method to detect and characterize
network anomalies, without relying on signatures, training, or labelled traffic of any kind. It adds to network (e.g., routers) or security components, thanks to unsupervised learning, some analysis and decision making capabilities for limiting the need of a human operator. This aims at making decision very fast, and configure efficiently and autonomously actual security devices (IDS, firewall, ...) as soon as a new anomaly or attack is encountered. A first version of the unsupervised anomaly detection method was initially proposed in [1]. It relies on the use of sub-space clustering and Evidence Accumulation. This first proposed approach permits to detect both well-known as well as completely unknown anomalies, and to automatically produce easy-to-interpret signatures that characterize them.

In this paper, a new augmented version of this previous proposal is presented. The global objectives are similar. Nevertheless, it aims at increasing robustness and correctness of the decision making process by integrating new techniques as Inter-Clustering Result Association (ICRA) and Anomaly Correlation. Figure 1 depicts the high-level structure of our approach and its steps. It depicts both the techniques presented in previous papers (that will be nevertheless shortly presented in this one for making the paper self contained and understandable without referring to this previous publication) as well as the new ones recently integrated and which constitutes the new contribution: ICRA and Anomaly Correlation. Figure 1 serves all along this paper, and will be further described in the following sections.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a very brief state of the art in the supervised and unsupervised anomaly detection fields, additionally describing our main contributions. Section III presents an in-depth description of the clustering techniques and detection algorithms that we use. Section IV presents the anomaly correlation technique that improves the anomaly extraction phase. Section V presents the automatic anomaly characterization algorithm, which builds easy-to-interpret signatures for the detected anomalies. Section VI evaluates the computational time of the unsupervised detection approach, considering the parallelization of the clustering algorithms. Section VII presents a simple validation of our proposals, discovering and characterizing several anomalies in real network traffic from the MAWI trace repository [2]. Finally, section VIII concludes this paper.

II. RELATED WORK

The problem of network anomaly detection has been extensively studied during the last decade. Traditional approaches analyze statistical variations of traffic volume metrics (e.g., number of bytes, packets, or flows) and/or other specific traffic features (e.g., distribution of IP addresses and ports), using either single-link measurements or network-wide data. A non-exhaustive list of methods includes the use of signal processing techniques (e.g., ARIMA, wavelets) on single-link traffic measurements [3], [4], PCA [5], [6] and Kalman filters [7] for network-wide anomaly detection, and Sketches applied to IP-flows [8], [9].

The URCA tool [10] has an hybrid approach which relies on both signatures and supervised learning. This tool uses as input the result of any anomaly detection system. It is able to classify anomalies by associating them with previously manually built signatures through hierarchical clustering. However, if the anomaly detection algorithm used detects an anomaly which is different from every built-in signature, this system is unable to classify or characterize the considered unknown anomaly.

Our proposal falls within the unsupervised anomaly detection domain. Most work has been devoted to the Intrusion Detection field, focused on the well known KDD’99 data-set. The vast majority of the unsupervised detection schemes proposed in the literature are based on clustering and outliers detection, being [11]–[13] some relevant examples. In [11], authors use a single-linkage hierarchical clustering method to cluster data from the KDD’99 data-set, based on the standard Euclidean distance for inter-pattern similarity. Clusters are considered as normal-operation activity, and patterns lying outside a cluster are flagged as anomalies. Based on the same ideas, [12] reports improved results in the same data-set, using three different clustering algorithms: Fixed-Width clustering, an optimized version of $k$-NN, and one class SVM. Finally, [13] presents a combined density-grid-based clustering algorithm to improve computational complexity, obtaining similar detection results.

III. UNSUPERVISED ANOMALY DETECTION

The algorithm runs in three consecutive stages. Firstly, multi-resolution flow aggregation is applied on the traffic in order to build several simple metrics such as number of bytes, packets or flows. Any time series based change detection algorithm is then applied to the previously built traffic metrics in order to detect a change. This first step is depicted on the upper part of figure 1. The unsupervised detection algorithm is depicted on the lower part of figure 1 and begins in the second stage, using as input the set of flows captured in the time slot flagged as anomalous. Sub-Space Clustering (SSC) [14] and multiple Evidence Accumulation (EA) [15] are used to blindly extract the suspicious traffic flows that compose the anomaly. We however show in this paper that EA actually lacks robustness. We hence propose a new technique to combine the SSC results called Inter-Clustering Results Association (ICRA). In order to provide further improvements in terms of results robustness, we introduce a new method to
correlate anomalies detected in several feature spaces. In the third stage of the algorithm, the evidence of traffic structure is further used to produce filtering rules that characterize the detected anomaly, which are ultimately combined into a new anomaly signature. This signature provides a simple and easy-to-interpret description of the problem, easing network operator tasks.

Our anomaly detection works on single-link packet-level traffic captured in consecutive time-slots of fixed length $\Delta_T$. The first analysis stage consists in change detection. At each time-slot, traffic is aggregated in 9 different flow levels $l_i$. These include (from finer to coarser-grained resolution): source IPs ($l_1$: IPsrc), destination IPs ($l_2$: IPdst), source Network Prefixes ($l_3$:$5$: IPsrc/24, /16, /8), destination Network Prefixes ($l_6$:$7$:$8$: IPdst/24, /16, /8), and traffic per Time Slot ($l_9$: tpTS). Time series $Z_{ti}^{l_i}$ are built for basic traffic metrics such as number of bytes, packets, and IP flows per time slot, using the 9 flow resolutions $l_1$:$9$. Any generic anomaly-detection algorithm $F(.)$ based on time-series analysis [3], [4], [7], [8], [16] is then used on $Z_{ti}^{l_i}$ to identify an anomalous slot. In this case, we use absolute detoids [16] based on volume metrics time series ($\#$packets, $\#$bytes and $\#$syn). Time slot $t_j$ is flagged as anomalous if $F(Z_{ti}^{l_i})$ triggers an alarm for any of the $l_i$ flow aggregation levels. Tracking anomalies at multiple aggregation levels provides additional reliability to the anomaly detector, and permits to detect both single source-destination and distributed attacks of very different intensities.

The unsupervised anomaly detection stage takes as input all the flows in the time slot flagged as anomalous, aggregated according to one of the different levels used in the first stage. An anomaly will generally be detected in different aggregation levels, and there are many ways to select a particular aggregation to use in the unsupervised stage; for the sake of simplicity, we shall skip this issue, and use any of the aggregation levels in which the anomaly was detected. Without loss of generality, let $Y = \{y_1, \ldots, y_F\}$ be the set of $F$ flows in the flagged time slot, referred to as patterns in more general terms. Each flow $y_f \in Y$ is described by a set of $A$ traffic attributes or features. In this paper, we use a list traffic attributes widely used in literature. The list includes $A = 9$ traffic features: number of source/destination IP addresses and ports, ratio of number of sources to number of destinations, packet rate, ratio of packets to number of destinations, and fraction of ICMP and SYN packets. According to our previous work on signature-based anomaly characterization [17], such simple traffic descriptors permit characterization of general traffic anomalies in easy-to-interpret terms. The list is therefore by no means exhaustive, and more features can be easily plugged-in to improve results. Let $x_f = (x_f(1), \ldots, x_f(A)) \in \mathbb{R}^A$ be the corresponding vector of traffic features describing flow $y_f$, and $X = (x_1, \ldots, x_F)$ the complete matrix of features, referred to as the feature space.

The unsupervised detection algorithm is based on clustering techniques applied to $X$. The objective of clustering is to partition a set of unlabelled patterns into homogeneous groups of similar characteristics, based on some measure of similarity. Table I explains the characteristics of each anomaly in terms of type, distributed nature, aggregation type and netmask used, and impact on traffic features. On one hand, a SYN DDoS which targets one machine from a high number of hosts located in several /24 addresses will constitute a cluster if flows are aggregated in $l_9$. In fact, each of these /24 addresses will have traffic attributes values different from the ones of normal traffic: a high number of packet, a single destination and many SYN packets. It is the whole set of these flows that will create a cluster. On the other hand, if flows are aggregated in $l_6$, the only destination address will be an outlier characterized by many sources and a high proportion of SYN packets.

Our particular goal is to identify and to isolate the different flows that compose the anomaly flagged in the first stage, both in a robust way. Unfortunately, even if hundreds of clustering algorithms exist [18], it is very difficult to find a single one that can handle all types of cluster shapes and sizes, or even decide which algorithm would be the best for our particular problem. Different clustering algorithms produce different partitions of data, and even the same clustering algorithm provides different results when using different initializations and/or different algorithm parameters. This is in fact one of the major drawbacks in current cluster analysis techniques: the lack of robustness.

To avoid such a limitation, we have developed a divide and conquer clustering approach, using the notions of clustering ensemble [19] and multiple clusterings combination. A clustering ensemble $P$ consists of a set of $N$ partitions $P_n$ produced for the same data with $n = 1, \ldots, N$. Each of these partitions provides a different and independent evidence of data structure, which can be combined to construct a global clustering result for the whole feature space. There are different ways to produce a clustering ensemble. We use Sub-Space Clustering (SSC) [14] to produce multiple data partitions, applying the same clustering algorithm to $N$ different sub-spaces $U_n \subset X$ of the original space.

### A. Clustering Ensemble and Sub-Space Clustering

Each of the $N$ sub-spaces $U_n \subset X$ is obtained by selecting $R$ features from the complete set of $A$ attributes. The number of sub-spaces $N$ hence is equal to $R$-combinations-obtained-from-$A$. To set the sub-space dimension $R$, we take a very useful property of monotonicity in clustering sets, known as the downward closure property: “if a collection of points is a cluster in a $d$-dimensional space, then it is also part of a cluster in any $(d-1)$ projections of this space” [20]. This directly implies that, if there exists any evidence of density in $X$, it will certainly be present in its lowest-dimensional sub-spaces. Using small values for $R$ provides several advantages: firstly, doing clustering in low-dimensional spaces is more efficient and faster than clustering in bigger dimensions. Secondly, density-based clustering algorithms provide better results in low-dimensional spaces [20], because high-dimensional spaces are usually sparse, making it difficult to distinguish between high and low density regions. We shall therefore use $R = 2$ in our SSC algorithm, which gives $N = C_R^A = A(A - 1)/2$ partitions.
**TABLE I**

Feature used for the detection of DoS, DDoS, network/port scans, and spreading worms. Anomalies of distributed nature 1-to-N or N-to-1 involve several /24 (source or destinations) addresses contained in a single /16 address.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anomaly</th>
<th>Distributed nature</th>
<th>Aggregation type</th>
<th>Clustering result</th>
<th>Impact on traffic features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DoS (ICMP $\lor$ SYN)</td>
<td>1-to-1</td>
<td>IP.dst/$+$</td>
<td>Outlier</td>
<td>$n$Srcs = $n$Dsts = 1, $n$Pkt/s/seg $&gt; \lambda_1$, avgPktSize $&lt; \lambda_2$, $(n$ICMP/$n$Pkt$s) &gt; \lambda_3 \lor n$SYN/$n$Pkt$s) &gt; \lambda_4)$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDoS (ICMP $\lor$ SYN)</td>
<td>to several @IP/24</td>
<td>IP/src/24 ($\land$)</td>
<td>Cluster</td>
<td>$n$Dsts = 1, $n$Srcs $&gt; \alpha_1$, $n$Pkt/s/seg $&gt; \alpha_2$, avgPktSize $&lt; \alpha_3$, $(n$ICMP/$n$Pkt$s) &gt; \alpha_4 \lor n$SYN/$n$Pkt$s) &gt; \alpha_5)$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port scan</td>
<td>1-to-1</td>
<td>IP.dst/$+$</td>
<td>Outlier</td>
<td>$n$Srcs = $n$Dsts = 1, $n$DstPorts $&gt; \delta_1$, avgPktSize $&lt; \delta_2$, $n$SYN/$n$Pkt$s) &gt; \delta_3$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network scan to</td>
<td>1-to-1</td>
<td>IP/src/24 ($\land$)</td>
<td>Cluster</td>
<td>$n$Srcs = 1, $n$Dsts $&gt; \delta_1$, $n$DstPorts $&gt; \delta_2$, avgPktSize $&lt; \delta_3$, $n$SYN/$n$Pkt$s) &gt; \delta_4$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>several @IP/24</td>
<td></td>
<td>IP/dist/16 ($\lor$)</td>
<td>Cluster</td>
<td>$n$Srcs = 1, $n$Dsts $&gt; \eta_1$, $n$DstPorts $&gt; \eta_2$, avgPktSize $&lt; \eta_3$, $n$SYN/$n$Pkt$s) &gt; \eta_4$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spreading worms to</td>
<td>1-to-N</td>
<td>IP.src/$+$</td>
<td>Outlier</td>
<td>$n$Srcs = 1, $n$Dsts $&gt; \eta_1$, $n$DstPorts $&gt; \eta_2$, avgPktSize $&lt; \eta_3$, $n$SYN/$n$Pkt$s) &gt; \eta_4$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>several @IP/24</td>
<td></td>
<td>IP/dist/16 ($\lor$)</td>
<td>Cluster</td>
<td>$n$Srcs = 1, $n$Dsts $&gt; \eta_1$, $n$DstPorts $&gt; \eta_2$, avgPktSize $&lt; \eta_3$, $n$SYN/$n$Pkt$s) &gt; \eta_4$.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. Combining Multiple Partitions**

Having produced the $N$ partitions, we now explore different methods to combine these partitions in order to build a single partition where anomalous flows are easily distinguishable from normal-operation traffic: the classical Evidence Accumulation (EA) and the new Inter-Clustering Result Association (ICRA) method.

1) **Combining Multiple Partitions using Evidence Accumulation:** A possible answer is provided in [15], where authors introduced the idea of multiple-clusterings Evidence Accumulation (EA). By simple definition of what it is, an anomaly may consist of either outliers or small-size clusters, depending on the aggregation level of flows in $Y$ (cf table I). EA then uses the cluster ensemble $P$ to build two inter-pattern similarity measures between the flows in $Y$. These similarity measures are stored in two elements: a similarity matrix $S$ to detect small clusters and a vector $D$ used to rank outliers. $S(p,q)$ represents the similarity between flows $p$ and $q$. This value increases when the flows $p$ and $q$ are in the same cluster many times and when the size of this cluster is small. These two parameters allows the algorithm to target small clusters. $D(o)$ represents the abnormality of the outlier $o$. This value increases when the outlier has been classified as such several times and when the separation between the outlier and the normal traffic is important. As we are only interested in finding the smallest-size clusters and the most dissimilar outliers, the detection consists in finding the flows with the biggest similarity in $S$ and the biggest dissimilarity in $D$. Any clustering algorithm can then be applied on the matrix $S$ values to obtain a final partition of $X$ that isolates small-size clusters of close similarity values. A variable detection threshold over the values in $S$ is also able to detect small-size cluster. Concerning dissimilar outliers, they can be isolated though a threshold applied on the values in $D$.

2) **Combining Multiple Partitions using Inter-Clustering result Association:** However, by reasoning on the similarities between patterns (here flows), EA introduces several potential errors. Let us consider two pattern sets $P_i$ and $P_j$, if the cardinality of these pattern sets is close and if they are present in a similar number of sub-spaces, then EA will produce a very close (potentially the same) similarity value for both flow sets. They will then likely be falsely considered as belonging to the same cluster. This possibility is to be considered very seriously as it can induce a huge error: different anomalies will be merged together and will then likely be wrongly identified and characterized. Another source of potential error when using a clustering algorithm over $S$ values is the algorithm sensitivity to wrong parameters. Furthermore, the use of a threshold over $S$ and/or $D$ can decrease the system performance in case of a wrong value used.

In order to avoid the previously exposed sources of error, we introduce a new way of combining clustering results obtained from sub-spaces: Inter-Clustering Results Association. The idea is to address the problem in terms of cluster of flows and outlier of flow similarity instead of pattern (or flow) similarity. Hence, we shift the similarity measure from the patterns to the clustering results. The problem can then be split in two sub-problems: correlate clusters through Inter-CLuster Association (ICLA), and correlate outlier through Inter-Outlier Association (IOA).

In each case, a graph is used to express similarity between either clusters or outliers. Each vertex is a cluster/outlier from any sub-space $U_n$ and each edge represents the fact that two connected vertices are similar. The underlying idea is straightforward: identify clusters or outliers present in different sub-spaces that contain the same flows. To do so, we first define a cluster similarity measure called $CS$ between two clusters $C_r$ and $C_s$: $CS(C_r,C_s) = \max(\text{card}(C_r),\text{card}(C_s))$, $\text{card}$ being the function that associates a pattern set with its cardinality, and $C_r \cap C_s$ the intersection of $C_r$ and $C_s$. Each edge in the cluster similarity graph between two clusters $C_r$ and $C_s$ means $CS(C_r,C_s) > 0.9$, being this an empirically chosen value. 1. IOA uses an outlier similarity graph built by linking every outlier to every other outlier that contains the same pattern. Once these graphs are built, we need to find cluster sets where every cluster contains the same flows. In terms of vertices, we need to find vertex sets where every vertex is linked to every other vertex. In graph theory, such vertex set is called a clique. The clique search problem is a NP-hard problem. Most existing solutions use exhaustive search inside

1The value 0.9 guarantees that the vast majority of patterns are located in both clusters with a small margin of error.
the vertex set which is too slow for our application. We then make the hypothesis that a vertex can only be part of a single clique. A greedy algorithm is then used to build each clique. Anomalous flow set are finally identified as the intersection of all the flow sets present in the clusters or outliers within each clique.

IV. CORRELATING ANOMALIES FROM MULTIPLE AGGREGATION

At the end of the ICLA/IOA step, many anomalies can be found. However, it is a priori not possible to assess an anomaly’s potential danger. A good way to evaluate its potential impact is to find out whether it is visible in several aggregation levels \( l_i \). In fact, if an anomaly appears as such within several aggregation levels, it means that its flows are significantly different from the normal traffic in each of these aggregation levels, and thus, potentially dangerous in each of them. Therefore, we present a system that correlates anomalies found in several aggregation levels \( l_i \) in order to filter anomalies present in one or few aggregation level and thus that we consider as having a limited impact. The system will then also able to characterize the anomaly through a signature for each aggregation level used, thus improving the characterization reliability.

In order to correlate anomalies from different aggregation levels, we define two unique characteristics of an anomaly: its source (source IP address set) and its destination (destination IP address set). We then define the similarity between two IP address sets as the ratio between the sets’ intersection cardinality and the maximum cardinality of each IP address sets. If the similarities of the two IP address sets (source and destination) of two different anomalies are over a specific threshold, it guarantees that these anomalies have a very similar source and destination IP address sets. In this work, we chose to only correlate anomalies detected from aggregation levels source and destination, in order to avoid correlating anomalies located in same aggregation level type (e.g. \( l_3 \) and \( l_1 \)), that would be potentially contained in each other. Finally, correlated anomalies are then built from each couple of similar anomalies.

V. AUTOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF ANOMALIES

At this stage, the algorithm has identified several correlated anomalies containing a set of traffic flows in \( Y \) far out the rest of the traffic. The following task is to produce filtering rules to correctly isolate and characterize each of these anomalies. Even more, this signature could eventually be compared against well-known signatures to automatically classify the anomaly.

In order to produce filtering rules, the algorithm selects those sub-spaces \( U_n \) where the separation between the considered anomalous flows and the rest of the traffic is the biggest. We define two different classes of filtering rule: absolute rules \( FR_A(Y) \) and relative rules \( FR_R(Y) \). Absolute rules do not depend on the separation between flows, and correspond to the presence of dominant features in the considered flows.

An absolute rule for a certain feature \( j \) characterizing a certain flow set \( Y_g \) has the form \( FR_A(Y_g, a) = \{ \forall y_f \in Y_g \subset Y : x_f(a) = \lambda \} \). For example, in the case of an ICMP flooding attack, the vast majority of the associated flows use only ICMP packets, hence the absolute filtering rule \( \{ nICMP/nPkt == 1 \} \) makes sense. On the contrary, relative filtering rules depend on the relative separation between anomalous and normal-operation flows. Basically, if the anomalous flows are well separated from the normal cluster in a certain partition \( P_n \), then the features of the corresponding sub-space \( U_n \) are good candidates to define a relative filtering rule. A relative rule has the form \( FR_R(Y_g, a) = \{ \forall y_f \in Y_g \subset Y : x_f(a) < \lambda \lor x_f(a) > \lambda \} \). We shall also define a covering relation between filtering rules: we say that rule \( f_1 \) covers rule \( f_2 \) \( \iff f_2(Y) \subset f_1(Y) \). If two or more rules overlap (i.e., they are associated to the same feature), the algorithm keeps the one that covers the rest.

In order to construct a compact signature of the anomaly, we have to devise a procedure to select the most discriminant filtering rules. Absolute rules are important, because they define inherent characteristics of the anomaly. As regards relatives rules, their relevance is directly tied to the degree of separation between anomalous and normal flows. In the case of outliers, we select the \( K \) features for which the Mahalanobis distance to the normal-operation traffic is among the top-\( K \) biggest distances. In the case of small-size clusters, we rank the relatives rules according to the degree of separation to the normal anomaly using the well-known Fisher Score (FS) which uses the variance in each cluster (normal and anomalous). To finally construct the signature, the absolute rules and the top-\( K \) relative rules are combined into a single inclusive predicate, using the covering relation in case of overlapping rules.

VI. COMPUTATIONAL TIME AND PARALLELIZATION

The last issue that we analyze is the Computational Time (CT) of the algorithm. The SSC-EA/ICRA-based algorithm performs multiple clusterings in \( N(A) \) low-dimensional subspaces \( U_n \subset X \). This multiple computation imposes scalability issues for on-line detection of attacks in very-high-speed networks. Two key features of the algorithm are exploited to reduce scalability problems in number of features \( A \) and the number of aggregated flows \( F \) to analyze. Firstly, clustering is performed in very-low-dimensional sub-spaces, \( U_n \in \mathbb{R}^2 \), which is faster than clustering in high-dimensional spaces [18]. Secondly, each sub-space can be clustered independently of the other sub-spaces, which is perfectly adapted for parallel computing architectures. Parallelization can be achieved in different ways: using a single multi-processor and multi-core machine, using network-processor cards and/or GPU (Graphic Processor Unit) capabilities, using a distributed group of machines, or combining these techniques. We shall use the term ”slice” as a reference to a single computational entity.

Figure 2 depicts the CT of the SSC-EA/ICRA-based algorithm, both (a) as a function of the number of features \( A \) used to describe traffic flows and (b) as a function of the
number of flows $F$ to analyze. Figure 2.(a) compares the CT obtained when clustering the complete feature space $X$, referred to as $CT(X)$, against the CT obtained with SSC, varying $A$ from 2 to 29 features. We analyze a large number of aggregated flows, $F = 10^4$, and use two different number of slices, $S = 40$ and $S = 100$. The analysis is done with traffic from the WIDE network, combining different traces to attain the desired number of flows. To estimate the CT of SSC for a given value of $A$, we separately cluster each of the $A$ and $S$ features and slices, and take the worst-case of the obtained clustering time as a representative measure of the CT in a single subspace, i.e., $CT(X_{SSCwc}) = \max_a CT(U_{n_a})$. Then, if $N \leq S$, we have enough slices to completely parallelize the SSC algorithm, and the total CT corresponds to the worst-case, $CT(X_{SSCwc})$. On the contrary, if $N > S$, some slices have to cluster various sub-spaces, one after the other, and the total CT becomes $(N\%S + 1)$ times the worst-case CT $CT(X_{SSCwc})$, where $\%$ represents integer division. The first interesting observation from figure 2.(a) regards the increase of $CT(X)$ when $A$ increases, going from about 8 seconds for $A = 2$ to more than 200 seconds for $A = 29$. As we said before, clustering in low-dimensional spaces is faster, which reduces the overhead of multiple clusterings computation. The second paramount observation is about parallelization: if the algorithm is implemented in a parallel computing architecture, it can be used to analyze large volumes of traffic using many traffic descriptors in an on-line basis; for example, if we use 20 traffic features and a parallel architecture with 100 slices, we can analyze 100000 aggregated flows in less than 20 seconds.

Figure 2.(b) compares $CT(X)$ against $CT(X_{SSCwc})$ for an increasing number of flows $F$ to analyze, using $A = 20$ traffic features and $S = N = 190$ slices (i.e., a completely parallelized implementation of the SSC-EA-based algorithm). As before, we can appreciate the difference in CT when clustering the complete feature space vs. using low-dimensional sub-spaces: the difference is more than one order of magnitude, independently of the number of flows to analyze. Regarding the volume of traffic that can be analyzed with this 100% parallel configuration, the SSC-EA/ICRA-based algorithm can analyze up to 50000 flows with a reasonable CT, about 4 minutes in this experience. In the presented evaluations, the number of aggregated flows in a time slot of $\Delta T = 20$ seconds rounds the 2500 flows, which represents a value of $CT(X_{SSCwc}) \approx 0.4$ seconds. For the $m = 9$ features that we have used ($N = 36$), and even without doing parallelization, the total CT is $N \times CT(X_{SSCwc}) \approx 14.4$ seconds.

VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION IN REAL TRAFFIC

We evaluate the ability of our algorithm to detect and to construct a signature for different anomalies located in the same real traffic trace from the public MAWI repository of the WIDE project [2]. The WIDE operational network provides interconnection between different research institutions in Japan, as well as connections to different commercial ISPs and universities in the U.S.. The traffic repository consists of 15 minutes-long raw packet traces collected daily since 1999. The network traffic we shall work on consist of traffic from one of the trans-pacific links between Japan and the U.S., captured at sample point B. Reference [21] provides fragmented documentation for the whole data set.

ICLA phase results for destination IP address /24 aggregated data are displayed on figure 3.(a). Each vertex is a cluster found in any of the generated sub-spaces. Each vertex number is the index of a cluster among the whole cluster set within the clustering ensemble $P$. The normal traffic is represented by the vertex group with the highest number of vertices. Every other group of points is a clique and potentially contains an anomaly. Figure 3.(b) depicts the outlier similarity graph obtained for destination IP address /24 aggregated data during the IOA phase. Each vertex number is the index of the associated outlier among the whole outlier set within the clustering ensemble $P$. The same graphs are built over the source IP address /24 aggregated data. Every edge means that the linked clusters or outliers are similar according to the criteria defined in III-B2.

Every connected component which is also a clique is then extracted from the graph, considered as a potential anomaly. Each potential anomaly is assigned an index. This index has the following meaning: values between 0 and 99 means anomalies from clusters found in source IP address aggregated data, values between 100 and 199 means anomalies from outliers found in source IP address aggregated data, values between 200 and 299 means cluster found in destination IP address aggregated data and values between 300 and 399 means anomalies from outliers found in destination IP address aggregated data. The choice of 100 anomalies for each type of anomaly source is made under the assumption that there is less than 100 cliques in each graph.

Once anomalies are extracted from feature spaces by the unsupervised detection, we apply anomaly correlation in order to find flows that are different from the normal ones in both aggregation type: source IP address and destination IP address. Figure 3.(c) depicts the anomalies similarities as a graph. Anomaly correlation then extracts three edges from the graph. Each edge represents the link between two similar anomalies, here anomalies 101 and 300, 111 and 305, and finally 100 and 205.
The completely unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm we have presented has many interesting advantages w.r.t. previous proposals in the field. It uses exclusively unlabelled data to detect and characterize network anomalies, without assuming any kind of signature, particular model, or canonical data distribution. This allows to detect new previously unseen anomalies, even without using statistical-learning or human analysis or decision making. Despite using ordinary clustering techniques, the algorithm avoids the lack of robustness of general clustering approaches by combining the notions of Sub-Space Clustering/Sub-Space Clustering, Inter-Cluster Association & Anomaly Correlation for Unsupervised Network Anomaly Detection and Anomaly Correlation. The characterization approach permits the construction of easy-to-interpret-and-to-visualize results, providing insights and explanations about the detected anomalies to the network operator.

We have evaluated the computational time of our algorithm. Results confirm that the use of the algorithm for on-line unsupervised detection and characterization is possible and easy to achieve for the volumes of traffic that we have analysed. Even more, they show that if run in a parallel architecture, the algorithm can reasonably scale-up to run in high-speed networks, using more traffic descriptors to characterize network attacks.

We have verified the effectiveness of our proposal to detect and isolate distributed network anomalies on real traffic, in a completely blind fashion, without assuming any particular traffic model, significant clustering parameters, or even clusters structure beyond a basic definition of what an anomaly is. This provides a strong evidence of the accuracy of the
SSC-ICLA/IOA-Anomaly Correlation-based method to detect network anomalies. We think that this approach constitute a great step toward an autonomous network anomaly detection that will allow networks to self-diagnose themselves and thus faster reactions and lower operational costs.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work has been done in the framework of the ECODE project, funded by the European commission under grant FP7-ICT-2007-2/223936.

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